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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. L. REESE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THOMAS R. HARPER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT 
Civil No. 8836 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent desires to call to the attention of the 
Court certain additions to and corrections in the statement 
of facts in appellant's brief. 
Before referring to the facts, however, appellant sug-
gests in his brief (page 3) that justice could not be ob-
tained before a jury in Box Elder County, and infers that 
the decision against appellant in the lower court was 
rendered only because of the prejudice of the jury. 
Respondent answers that if appellant did not feel 
justice could be obtained before a Box Elder County jury~ 
it was his privilege as well as his duty to move for a change 
of venue. Failing in this we declare that appellant should 
not now be heard to complain that a Box Elder County 
jury will not act impartially and justly. 
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Appellant states on page 4 of his brief that "defend-
ant's case was tried on the theory of a difference between 
the terms of the listing agreement and the Receipt and 
Agreement." This is not a true and correct statement of 
respondent's theory, as will be apparent in the statement 
of points and the argument. 
Respondent on December 24, 1956, listed his dry 
farm for sale with Atlas Realty Company through Jesse 
L. Thompson, a real estate salesman for appellant who 
was doing business as Atlas Realty Company. Respondent 
did not contact appellant regarding the sale of his farm 
( R. 158) but rather, the lead on said listing was given to 
appellant by Ezra Zollinger ( R. 152, 153, 200) who later 
became appellant's "ready, willing and able purchaser." 
Five days after listing his property, respondent was 
handed a Receipt and Agreement (Ex. 1) in appellant's 
office in Logan, Utah, which had been signed by Jesse L. 
Thompson as agent for respondent. Appellant's name 
does not appear on the Receipt and Agreement to Pur-
chase, nor does the name Atlas Realty Co. 
There was no discussion had with regard to the terms 
of the sale agreement, pruticularly with regard to the pay-
tnent of the mortgages, prior to the time I-espondent was 
handed the Receipt and Agreen1ent (R. 35). 
Appellant testified that there was some discussion 
( Il.235). However, cross exan1ination of Jesse L. Thomp-
son ( R. 248) revealed that he had previously testified that 
the 1nortgages were never mentioned until after the Re-
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ceipt and Agreement had been signed by respondent and 
the broker, or appellant, was getting the final papers ready 
for signature: 
Q. Do you recall having your deposition taken be-
fore Mr. Parker on the twelfth of June in the 
District Court in Logan, Utah? 
· A. There's a deposition made. 
Q. Do you recall at that time, Mr. Thompson, of 
having this question put to you: "Did you know 
that Mr. Harper had mortgages on the property?" 
And your answer: "Those didn't come out until 
the broker was getting things ready. No, no 
mortgages were ever mentioned." Do you recall 
making a statement of that sort? 
A. I must have done if it's in there. 
Respondent, therefore, had no notice or indication from 
anything told him by appellant, that the terms of the sale 
would be any different, at least in essence, than the terms 
of employment agreed upon with appellant in the listing 
agreement (Ex. 5). · 
It is true, and respondent so stated (R. 163) that 
before signing the Receipt and Agreement to Purchase he 
glanced at the parts that had been hand written, saw the 
figure $30,000 and "encumbrances: none" and thought 
that was all he had coming and that it looked good enough 
to him (R. 162, 163). However, "encumbrances: none" 
meant to the respondent, as his testimony shows ( R. 189), 
that it was the $30,000 which was not to be encumbered. 
Appellant states on page 7 of his brief that respond-
ent testified that the amount of the mortgages was $8,500. 
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This ignores the fact that respondent also testified (R. 187) 
that there was other indebtedness in addition to the 
$8,500 land mortgage, and that appellant himself testified 
( R. 231) that he knew there was another obligation. There 
was, therefore, mortgage indebtedness of approximately 
$15,000 against respondent's property, which, together 
with the $30,000 figure in the Receipt and Agreement, 
equals the approximately $45,000 for which respondent 
always intended to sell his property. 
As soon as respondent ·realized no ·provision had been 
made for ·the mortgages ·in the Receipt and Agreement 
he went to Mr. -Zollinger,the purchaser, to warn him about 
them (R. 176), and learned then for the first time that 
he would have to pay off the mortgages himself, that by 
the terms of the Receipt and Agreement he would have 
to give the purchaser a clear title ( R. 176) 
Respondent then made an effort to work out an 
agreement of sale with the purchaser, as appellant points 
out on page 8 of his brief. This he was not able to do. 
The Escrow Agreement (Ex. 9) was prepared under 
the following circumstances ( R. 205) : 
Q. Now, in the preparing of the escrow agreement, 
I believe you (·Mr. Zollinger) had that written 
up, and you told Mr. Reese what forms you 
wanted in that escrow agreement; isn't that.right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And then they wrote it in for you. They filled 
in the terms for you? 
A. Yes, that's right. 
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Q. Mr. Harper wasn~t there, was he, at that time? 
A. No. 
This Escrow Agreement was presented to respondent and 
Mrs. Harper several days after the signing of the Receipt 
and Agreement. Both refused to sign. 
Appellant submits on page 7 of his brief that the 
Escrow Agreement contains a full description of the terms 
of the Receipt and Agreement. However, the briefest of 
examinations of the two instruments reveals that they 
differ in several material respects. Orner Call, Esq. of 
Brigham City, representing Mr. Harper in the matter of 
the Escrow Agreement, wrote to Judge M. C. Harris and 
informed him that because of these differences Mr. Harper 
would not sign the Escrow Agreement. During the trial 
Mr. Call testified as to the exact nature of these differences 
( R. 277, 278, 279, 281, 283). 
Appellant remarks (page 7) that Mr. Harper was 
invited, through his attorney, to prepare a type of contract 
agreeable to Harper. In view of the additional terms Mr. 
Zollinger was insisting upon, and the argument about 
price, this would obviously have been a futile act on re-
spondent's part. 
There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether or 
not Mrs. Harper, a joint tenant with respondent, was 
present when respondent signed the Receipt and Agree-
ment to Purchase, appellant testifying that she was and 
that she urged Mr. Harper to sign ( R. 225, 226), and re-
pondent and Mrs. Harper testifying that she was not. 
(R. 163, 195). 
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Appellant proves to be confused as to Mrs. Harper's 
presence. At one time he testified ( R. 223) that she was 
there and heard the details of the sale. At a later time 
he testified ( R. 230) that she was not there when the 
details were discussed. 
However, it would seem to be immaterial whether 
Mrs. Harper was present or not when the Receipt and 
Agreement was signed by respondent, though the logical 
conclusion would be that she was not, as it cannot be 
controverted that she did not sign the purchase agreement, 
or any other paper agreeing to the offer to purchase her's 
and respondent's property. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The appellant, as respondent's trusted agent, had 
a duty to disclose to respondent all essential facts of the 
transaction and terms of the agreement, in which duty 
he failed. 
2. The Jury in a Special \'erdict found that ~fr. 
Reese (appellant) did not fairly disclose to ~lr. Harper 
(respondent) all material facts \\~hich ~1r. Reese knew of 
and acquired concerning this transaction, which verdict 
the trial cotnt adopted and approved. 
3. Appellant failed to exercise the reasonable skill 
and diligence required of an agent in the interests of his 
principal. 
4. Appellant did not produce a buyer who was 
ready, willing and able to buy what the seller (respondent) 
had to sell. 
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5. Appellant did not secure a valid contract for 
the sale of respondenf s property, as required by the terms 
of his employment, nor were terms in contemplation of 
a binding contract ever agreed upon. 
6. The Receipt and Agreement to Purchase relied 
upon herein by appellant does not set forth the amount 
to be paid as the broker's commission. 
7. The Court did not err in making its additional 
Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 8. 
8. The Court did not err in making its Findings of 
Fact No.4. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Appellant, as respondent's trusted agent, had a 
duty to disclose to respondent all essential facts of the 
transaction and terms of the agreement, in which duty he 
failed. 
2. The Jury in a Special Verdict found that Mr. 
Reese (appellant) did not fairly disclose to Mr. Harper 
(respondent) all material facts which Mr. Reese knew 
of and acquired concerning this transaction, which verdict 
the trial court adopted and approved. 
The law in Utah specifically holds that the relation-
ship between a broker and his principal is a fiduciary 
relationship, and that the broker must make a full dis-
closure of all material facts to his principal: 
"Equity regards and treats this relation (of prin-
cipal and agent) in the same general manner, and 
with nearly the same strictness, as that of trustee and 
beneficiary. 
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"Any unfairness, any underhanded dealing, any 
use of knowledge not communicated to the principal, 
any lack of the perfect good faith which equity re-
quires, renders the transaction voidable. ( 2 Porn. Eq. 
Jur. section 959 )" Burt & Carlquist Co. vs. Marks 
et al., (Utah, 1918} 177 P. 224. 
"As is noted in American Jurisprudence: ( 4 Am. 
Jur., Brokers, Sec. 142): 
The faithful discharge of his duties is a condition 
precedent to any recovery upon the part of a broker 
for the services he has rendered his principal. Thus, he 
is not entitled to compensation if he fails to disclose 
to his principal any personal knowledge which he 
possesses relative to matters which are or may be 
material to his employer;J s interests.;J;J Reich vs. 
Christopulos (Utah, 1953) 256 P. 2d 238. 
''The Rule that nondisclosure of facts does not 
constitute fraud does not apply whe:re- there is an 
active concealment of facts. This is a fraud.;J, Bennett 
vs. Bowen (Utah, 1925) 238 P. 240. 
The weight of the evidence is that appellant failed to 
disclose to respondent who was to pay the mortgages. 
The Jury so found and considered this failure to be 
material. 
Appellant cites the cases of Johnson vs. Allen (Utah, 
1945) 158 P. 2d 134, and Garff Realty Co. vs. Better 
Buildings, Inc. (Utah, 1951) 234 P. 2d 842. There are 
certain basic differences between the facts in those and 
in the present case which should be pointed out. 
In the case of Johnson vs. Allen (supra) the question 
of fraud arose upon the signing of a listing agreement. 
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The Supreme Court agreed with Cooley in his book on 
Torts, 3d Ed., p. 933, that the ways of fraud are many 
and that the law must follow into all of them to rescue 
the victim, even to having to rescue one who has signed 
a contract without reading it, and been misled thereby. 
However, a fiduciary relationship must exist, and the 
signer must be disarmed from reading the contract. The 
Court then holds that the signing of a listing agreement 
is an arms length transaction between a broker and seller 
-that no relationship of trust exists. 
In the present case the listing agreement had been 
signed and agency established between appellant and 
respondent, as counsel for appellant stated during one of 
the pre trials in this case ( Tr. 69). Any dealings there-
after between respondent and appellant, including the 
presentation of the Receipt and Agreement to Purchase 
to respondent for his signature, were governed by the 
principles of the fiduciary relationship. Johnson vs. Allen 
(supra) is therefore not in point. 
The Supreme Court in Gar££ Realty Co. vs. Better 
Buildings, Inc. (supra) found there was no evidence to 
show a fiduciary relationship between the broker and the 
seller, and that no plea of mistake, fraud or overreaching 
had been entered-the question was purely contractural. 
In such a case the Court rightly held that: 
"A person who, having the capacity and an op-
portunity to read a contract, is not mislead as to its 
contents and who sustains no confidential relationship 
to the other party cannot avoid the contract on the 
ground of mistake if he signs it without reading it, at 
least in the absence of special circumstances excusing 
his failure to read it." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--12--
The evidence in the present case shows that respon-
dent sustained a confidential relationship to appellant, 
that he was misled as to the contents of the paper he 
signed, and that the special circumstances excusing his 
failure to read were that he had a right to rely on his 
agent to disclose the terms of the agreement, especially 
when they differed so considerably from the terms of his 
contract of employment. Furthermore, there was entered 
a plea of mistake, fraud or bad faith, and evidence intro-
duced to that plea. Again, the Garff Realty Co. case is 
not in point. 
The attention of the Court is invited to the following 
testimony by ~1r. Zollinger: (R. 201) 
Q. How did they pressure you, 1\Ir. Zollinger? (to 
make an offer for respondenf s property) 
A. Oh, they just said it was out there and I was the 
logical person to buy it, and I says I didn't want 
it, it was poor land, and they says, "''1 ell, make 
an offer." I finallv made a $25,000 offer and 
they said, oh, they couldn't get a price, they 
thought they could get it for thirty. (Italics ours). 
They said, "Will you go thirty?" I said, well I 
didn't know. I didn't want it. 
And later on: (R. 257) 
Q. Well, you say you didn't want the land before 
then. You didn't want the land, why did you 
buy it then? 
A. We didn't want it very bad. Twentv-five thous-
and dollars, it was a buy, good buy; yes. A fel-
low don't buy a poor buy. I didn't want it very 
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bad, so . .I offered a low price for it. If I had 
wanted- it bad, maybe I'd have paid $45,000, but 
I didn't want it bad. 
And another statement by Mr. Zollinger (R. 255) 
A. He called· me up three times, and I just laughed 
at him, and finally he said, "Well, come on in, 
I think that he'll probably sell for less than that." 
(Italics ours.) So I made him an offer of $25,000. 
This testimony is particularly interesting in view of 
an important Arizona decision which holds: 
"The law requires that a real estate broker em-
ployed to sell land must act in entire good faith and 
in the interest of his employer, and if he induces the 
prospective buyer to believe that the property can be 
bought for less, he thereby fails to discharge that 
duty and forfeits all his rights to claim commission 
and compensation for his work. 
"There is no doubt that the above proposition 
of law is correct. A real estate agent owes the duty 
of utmost good faith and loyalty to his principal." 
Haymes vs. Rogers (Arizona, 1950) 219 P. 2d 339, 
17 ALR 2d 296 (Annotated) 
3. Appellant failed to exercise the reasonable skill 
and diligence required of an agent in the interests of his 
principal. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld in Reich, et ux. vs. 
Christopulos, et al. (supra) the general principle that 
in undertaking the sale of property for his principal, the 
broker has a duty to represent his interest in good faith, 
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to discharge it with reasonable skill and diligence and to 
disclose to him all pertinent facts which would materially 
affect his interest. 
Did appellant exercise reasonable skill and diligence 
on behalf of respondent? Mr. S. L. Jeppson, a real estate 
salesman, was called to the stand on behalf of respondent 
and qualified as an expert in the field of selling real estate. 
The Court is invited to consider the following testimony 
by Mr. Jeppson (R. 268): 
Q. 111 ask you, Mr. Jeppson, give you a hypothetical 
question here. If a person came to you, gave 
you a listing on a piece of property for $45,000 
and you contacted three people with regard to 
selling it and one of them indicated that he 
wasn't interested under any circumstances be-
cause it was too small a farm; another made a 
very small offer of around five dollars an acre 
or something, which would amount to much less 
than the listing of $45,000; and a third person 
offered the sum of $30,000; these three people 
were contacted within a period of five days, one 
of these days being a holiday, Christmas; would 
you feel, is it your opinion in drawing up a con-
tract for a $30,000 deal on that property, that 
you had used reasonable diligence to get the best 
price possible for that piece of property? 
A. I'd never take the time to draw up a contract on 
that kind of an offer without first consulting the 
seller to know that he's interested in such a thing 
as that. 
Q. But do you have an opinon as to whether or not 
those factors would be using reasonable diligence 
to get the highest price possible for your seller? 
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A. Not the way I work it. I wouldn't feel like I had 
done any thing. (Italics ours ) . 
And on cross examination ( R. 270-, 271 ) : 
Q. Now, if you had Mr. Harper's signature on that 
(earnest money receipt and agreement to pur-
chase) and Mr. Zollinger, who was paying cash 
incidentally for this property, would you dis-
courage Mr. Harper from taking it? 
A. Well I believe I would at that price. 
Q. You would? 
A. Yeah. 
4. Appellant did not produce a buyer who was 
ready, willing and able to buy what the seller (respondent) 
had to sell. 
Appellant alleges in his statement of the facts (page 3) 
that he produced a buyer who was ready, willing and able 
to buy on terms other than the listing agreement, which 
modified terms respondent agreed to when he signed the 
Receipt and Agreement to Purchase. 
A study of the facts and testimony, together with an 
analysis of what those "other terms" were, supports re-
spondent's argument that appellant did not produce, as 
he claims, a ready, willing and able buyer. 
It was a matter of record that respondent's wife was 
a joint tenant with respondent in the property listed for 
sale. Therefore, though respondent represented that he 
had the authority to sell his wife's interest as well as his 
own on the terms and conditions of sale set forth in the 
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listing agreement, there was no such representation in 
respondent's signing of the Receipt and Agreement to 
Purchase. Her consent would be necessary as to the new 
terms. She did not give it. 
This principle of law is accepted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Little vs. Gorman (Utah, 1911) 141 P. 321, where 
it was held that when the wife refused to accept a new 
offer, the original terms of sale were not modified and 
thus the brokers were not entitled to recover their com-
mission because "they failed to produce a purchaser who 
was willing to purchase the property on the terms pro-
posed and submitted." 
. Inasmuch as, according to the Rule of Little vs. 
Gorman (supra) respondent could not commit the joint 
tenancy of his wife to the sale without her consent, which 
consent she never gave, either orally or in writing, the 
most respondent could possibly be considered to have 
committed himself to sell by the c;c;other terms" of the 
Receipt and Agreement to Purchase was his undivided 
one-half interest. 
The following question was submitted to appellant's 
proposed purchaser, Mr. Zollinger ( R. 153) : 
Q. Were you, at the time you signed this agreement, 
Mr. Zollinger, willing to purchase a one-haH in-
terest in this property in Hansel Valley for the 
$30,000 listed in this agreement? 
A. Why, no. Why buy one-half for $30,000? 
5. Appellant did not secure a valid contract for the 
sale of respondent's property, as required by the terms 
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of his contract of employment, nor were terms in con-
templation of a binding contract ever agreed upon. 
The listing agreement signed by respondent states 
that appellant was to be entitled to a commission "if a valid 
contract be made for the sale or exchange thereof before 
the expiration of this agreement."' 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that: 
"A broker who was employed by a special con-
tract. .. can recover only under his special contract, 
and cannot recover for procuring a purchaser ready, 
willing, and able to buy ... as would be the case if 
his employment were general. 
"Where, by the contract of employment, the com-
mission is made dependent upon certain conditions or 
contingencies, as upon the actual consummation of a 
sale. . . these stipulations will govern and a fulfill-
ment of performance of the prescribed conditions is 
generally essential to the right to compensation 
(Murphy vs. W. & W. Live Stock Co., Wyoming, 189 
857"). Watson vs. Odell et al., (Utah, 1921) 198 
P. 772 
The Receipt and Agreement was signed, of course, 
by appellant and respondent, but it certainly was not a 
valid contract, nor was it considered by the parties to be 
the final agreement. 
A later Utah case (Hoyt vs. Wasatch Homes, 1953, 
261 P. 2d 927) holds that a Receipt and Agreement to 
Purchase may be sufficient to base a broker's commission. 
However, the circumstances there were so completely 
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different as to take the case out of the general rule. The 
earnest money receipt had been signed by all the parties, 
and thereafter, after much discussing and negotiating, a 
definite understanding was reached and set forth in a 
memorandum. The Court especially remarked about the 
considerable effort the broker had put forth in working 
with the parties, and held that the seller's later refusal to 
go through with the deal amounted to bad faith. 
The facts in the present case do not bring it within 
the exception of Hoyt vs. Wasatch Homes. The general 
rule still applies to appellant who must therefore fulfill 
the terms of his special contract of employment and secure 
a valid contract for the sale of respondent's property be-
fore he would be entitled to his commission. This he did 
not do. 
Appellant contends that a valid contract in the form 
of an escrow agreement was presented to respondent and 
his wife which contained a ''full description of the terms," 
and which respondent and his wife were not justified in 
refusing to sign for the reason, apparently, that respondent 
made no specific objection to the price, but only to other 
differences. 
The theory appellant thus seems to be urging on the 
Court in this particular point is that since the purchaser 
was ready, willing and able to purchase for a certain price 
set forth in a preliminary receipt and agreement to pur-
chase, and since respondent made no specific objection 
to the price, but attempted to work out an agreement 
with the purchaser, those other differences cannot be 
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held to justify respondent and his wife in refusing to sign 
the Escrow Agreement, and therefore appellant should 
recover his commission. 
The law does not support appellant's theory. On the 
contrary, if the terms of the proferred final contract are 
different from those authorized by the seller, either in an 
original contract of employment or in a preliminary pur-
chase agreement signed subsequent to the listing agree-
ment: 
"the broker can lay no claim to his commissions. 
This is true even though there is but a slight var-
iance between the contract tendered by the broker 
and that authorized by his employer. Thus, if the 
person produced by a broker is willing to purchase 
at the price set by the employer of the latter but is 
not willing to pay such price in the exact manner 
prescribed ... the latter is not entitled to his com-
mission. . . The fact that the contract negotiated is 
more advantageous than that which the broker was 
authorized to enter into, does not alter the operation 
of the rule ... " 8 Am. Jr., Brokers, Sec. 176. 
The Escrow Agreement may have contained a full des-
cription of the terms upon which Mr. Zollinger was willing 
to purchase respondent's property-it obviously did not 
contain a description of either the terms of the original 
listing agreement or of the Receipt and Agreement to 
Purchase. Respondent and his wife, with perfect right, 
refused to sign the Escrow Agreement, and appellant's 
right to a commission was therefore not earned. 
6. The Receipt and Agreement to Purchase relied 
upon herein by appellant does not set forth the amount 
to be paid as the broker's commission. 
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Respondent submits that appellant cannot recover 
in this case on the basis of the Receipt and Agreement to 
Purchase for the reason that said agreement does not 
set forth the amount to be paid as the broker's commission, 
and the law in Utah does not permit a broker to recover 
for his services unless the agreement for a commission 
is set forth in writing. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Statute of Frauds: 25-5-4 ( 5). 
Appellant cannot resort to other writings. A Wash-
ington court has declared, in a case where the amount of 
the commission has been left blank, that resort must be 
made to other writings or oral testimony to determine 
the amount to be paid and that this, according to num-
erous decisions, could not be done. (Black vs. Milliken, 
1927, 255 P. 101) 
It was not a mutual mistake that could be corrected. 
In the case of Vogel vs. Ensor (Indiana, 131 N. E. 416), 
the contention was that the percentage of commission 
was omitted by mutual mistake of the parties, and that 
the contract could be reformed so as to insert the proper 
figures in the blank space, but the court was of the opinion 
that such relief was precluded by a proper application of 
the Statute of Frauds. 
7. The Court did not err in making its additional 
Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 8. 
Appellant suggests in his argument (pages 11, 12-~ 
that one of the questions of fact in this case is respondent's 
mental capacity to contract. This is not so, nor is this the 
issue referred to in the trial judge's Findings of Fact Nos. 
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7 and 8. The Court, after hearing respondent's testimony 
and observing respondent during the trial, concluded that 
the mental shortcomings of the respondent, which were 
or should have been apparent to appellant, imposed upon 
appellant a degree of care toward respondent, within the 
fiduciary relationship, which the appellant did not fulfill. 
The trial court made no finding whatsoever regarding 
respondent's mental or physical capacity to contract, but 
simply found that, in view of the evidence and his obser-
vation of respondent, the respondent's mental capacity 
and physical condition were such that appellant owed to 
respondent a degree of care which he failed to exercise. 
We submit that this was a proper and well supported 
finding. 
8. The Court did not err in making its Finding of 
Fact Nos. 4. 
Appellant criticises the trial judge's Finding of Fact 
No.4 on the ground that by finding that it was defendant's 
(respondent's) interest, intent and desire to receive the 
sum of $30,000 clear to him, the Court was attempting to 
"reform" the instrument in question. The trial court was 
doing no such thing. This is obviously not a suit for 
specific performance. The Court made no finding as 
to how the contract should have read, but merely found 
that respondent was mistaken and misled as to the terms 
of the contract, and that his mistake was induced by the 
failure on the part of appellant to show the requisite good 
faith toward his principal and disclose to him material 
facts concerning the offer he had obtained for the sale of 
his property. This would seem to be a highly proper 
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finding when a plea of mistake, fraud, or bad faith had 
been entered by respondent, and evidence offered in sup-
port of that plea. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For the reasons set forth herein, respondent submits 
that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed and 
that respondent should be granted his costs herein: 
1. That the relationship between appellant and re-
spondent was a fiduciary relationship and that appellant 
failed in his duty to make disclosure to respondent of 
certain material facts in the agreement he submitted to 
respondent. 
2. That the Jury in a Special Verdict found that 
appellant did not fairly disclose to respondent all material 
facts regarding the transaction, particularly with regard 
to who was to pay the mortgages, which verdict was 
adopted and approved by the trial judge. 
3. That appellant failed to exercise reasonable skill 
and diligence in his services to respondent as his trusted 
agent. 
4. That appellant did not secure a valid contract 
for the sale of respondent's property, as required by the 
terms of appellant's contract of employment; nor was 
there ever any agreement as to terms and price arrived 
at between respondent and the purchaser. 
5. That appellant failed to produce a purchaser who 
was ready, willing and able to purchase :espondent's 
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property; that the Escrow Agreement, purporting to con-
tain a full description of the terms of the Receipt and 
Agreement to Purchase was in fact so completely different 
in its terms and conditions that respondent and his wife 
had a perfect right to refuse to sign the same. 
6. That the Receipt and Agreement to Purchase 
relied upon herein by appellant as showing appellant to 
have completed a service for respondent, does not set 
forth the amount to be paid as the broker's commission, 
and that appellant cannot, therefore, recover a commission 
thereon. 
7. That the trial court's Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law were, in all respects, proper and well 
supported by the evidence. 
We submit that the decision of the lower Court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
OLSEN & CALDERWOOD 
SHERMA HANSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
and Defendant. 
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